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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44239 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-8425 
v.     ) 
     ) 
BRADLEY CLYDE GOODRICH, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Bradley Goodrich contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed and executed his sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction over the case.  
Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to sufficiently consider the sentencing 
goals of rehabilitation and protection of society in doing so, as the mitigating factors in 
this case reveal those goals would be better served by retaining jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the sentencing order and remand this case with 
instructions to retain jurisdiction.   
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 When Mr. Goodrich was thirteen, he witnessed his mother shoot and kill his 
adoptive father in a case of mistaken identity.  (See Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.192-93, 207.)  His mother was subsequently convicted of second 
degree murder and served time in prison, during which time Mr. Goodrich moved to 
California to try and support himself.  (PSI, p.193.)  Unfortunately, Mr. Goodrich 
developed a destructive lifestyle, which included abusing alcohol and drugs, such as 
marijuana.  (Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.12.)  Nevertheless, Mr. Goodrich was able to 
persevere and lived a mostly law-abiding life, except for a brief period of time when he 
was going through a divorce.  (See Tr., p.43, L.6 - p.44, L.6.)1 
 Things began to change in 2013, when Mr. Goodrich suffered a back injury while 
on the job, which left him unable to work.  (See PSI, p.197.)  He was prescribed 
hydrocodone until 2015, and he became addicted to that medication.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-
10.)  During that time, he also began using methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.9-10.)  His 
situation continued to devolve, which ended with him providing methamphetamine to a 
sixteen-year-old girl, with whom he had fostered a romantic, then a sexual, relationship.  
(See, e.g., R., pp.64-67.)  Ultimately, Mr. Goodrich was charged with several counts of 
sexual battery of a minor and several other charges related to his own possession of 
methamphetamine, as well as providing methamphetamine to the victim.  (See 
R., pp.64-67.) 
                                            
1 While the transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and 
paginated volumes, unless otherwise indicated, references to “Tr.” refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on April 25, 2016. 
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 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Goodrich pleaded guilty to one count of 
sexual battery of a minor and one count of possession of a controlled substance.  
(Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.9-14.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges, as well as charges in another case (though it retained the ability to 
argue the facts of the dismissed charges at sentencing), and recommend a sentence 
with two years fixed.  (Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.12-22.) 
 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recommended an aggregate 
underlying sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, with a period of retained 
jurisdiction so that the court could assess Mr. Goodrich’s potential for rehabilitation.  
(Tr., p.40, Ls.13-25.)  Defense counsel noted Mr. Goodrich’s moderate and increasing 
desire for, and amenability to, change.  (Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.)  The district court 
acknowledged several of the mitigating factors, even agreeing with Mr. Goodrich’s 
concern that the victim’s report carried an element of exaggeration.  (Tr., p.45, 
Ls.15-22.)  However, it decided not to retain jurisdiction, but rather, to impose and 
execute a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed on the sexual battery 
charge and a concurrent five years sentence, with two years fixed, on the possession 
charge.  (Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.)  It explained that it did not want to discount the possibility 
that Mr. Goodrich could become a law-abiding citizen again at some point in the future, 
but clarified, “the primary focus of this sentence was punishment for the bad behavior 
that occurred here.”  (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-14.) 
 Mr. Goodrich filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.183, 188.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed 
Mr. Goodrich’s sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Goodrich’s 
Sentence 
 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 
1982).  Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 
(1997).   
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  Therefore, a sentence which protects society and also 
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is because the protection of society is 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in 
sentencing.  Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial 
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consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 
(2015). 
The district court’s focus was not on either the primary goal or the initial 
consideration of sentencing.  Rather, it stated, “the primary focus of this sentence was 
punishment for the bad behavior that occurred here.”  (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-5.)  While that is a 
valid consideration, it should not be the primary focus of the sentence, particularly 
given all the mitigating factors present in this case.  For instance, Mr. Goodrich, who 
was fifty-six years old at the time of sentencing (PSI, p.182), had significant periods of 
law-abiding behavior.  (See PSI, pp.188-91.)  He was able to do so despite witnessing a 
truly tragic event which ultimately resulted in him developing a destructive lifestyle 
involving drug and alcohol abuse.  (See Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.12.)  Additionally, he was 
only unable to maintain his mostly law-abiding lifestyle when a work-place injury 
resulted in a new set of addictions, which in turn, fueled his decisions with the victim in 
this case.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.33, Ls.1-13.)   
To that point, Mr. Goodrich did express remorse, and accepted responsibility, for 
his conduct, particularly in regard to the charge of giving drugs to the victim.  
(PSI, p.187; Tr., p.42, Ls.16-23.)  Acknowledgment of guilt, even if limited, still indicates 
that he is taking the first steps toward rehabilitation.  See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 
815 (Ct. App. 2010).  And, as defense counsel explained, Mr. Goodrich has a moderate 
and growing desire to continue that process.  (Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.)  
Furthermore, as the psychosexual evaluation revealed, Mr. Goodrich’s risk to reoffend 
was the product of dynamic factors, i.e., factors that were capable of changing through 
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rehabilitative efforts.  (See PSI, pp.162-63 (explaining Mr. Goodrich’s score in regard to 
dynamic risk factors was high); compare PSI, pp.158-59 (explaining that Mr. Goodrich’s 
score in regard to static, or unchangeable, risk factors was only low-moderate).)  As 
such, it recommended treatment in a supervised scenario. (See PSI, p.178; cf. Tr., p.21, 
Ls.7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging that recommendation).) 
For these reasons, defense counsel explained a period of retained jurisdiction 
would best serve the goals of sentencing because it would provide the district court with 
additional information on Mr. Goodrich’s growing dedication to, and ability to complete, 
a rehabilitative program, and so, more quickly return to being a productive member of 
society.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-23.)  That is, after all, the purpose of allowing the district 
courts to retain jurisdiction.  See, e.g., State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(“The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial 
court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and 
suitability for probation.”).  And, as defense counsel acknowledged (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-23), 
if the district court was not satisfied with Mr. Goodrich’s performance during the period 
of retained jurisdiction, it could still relinquish jurisdiction and require Mr. Goodrich to 
serve the underlying sentence.  See, e.g., State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) 
(affirming an order revoking probation despite a recommendation from the rider staff 
that the defendant be placed on probation).   
Furthermore, while the district court did acknowledge some of the mitigating 
factors (see, e.g., Tr., p.47, Ls.10-20), it did not sufficiently consider their full impact in 
regard to all the sentencing factors.  Rather, it considered those factors in regard to how 
they affected the amount of punishment it would order.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.47, Ls.10-22 
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(explaining that, because of Mr. Goodrich’s demonstrated ability to overcome prior 
addictions and live a law-abiding lifestyle, “it is for that reason I’m not giving you a 
longer sentence than I do.  I could send you to prison for life.”).)  The district court did 
not, for example, sufficiently appreciate the impact of those factors on the potential for 
actually addressing Mr. Goodrich’s underlying issues through a timely opportunity for 
rehabilitation.  (See Tr., p.51, Ls.5-14 (the district court simply articulating the hope that 
Mr. Goodrich can become a productive member of society at some unspecified point in 
the future).)  Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have 
recognized that the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at 
sentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 
91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Eubank, 
114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988).   
Furthermore, providing for rehabilitative opportunities actually provides better 
protection to society in the long-term because it actually addresses the issues which 
underlie the criminal conduct.  This is particularly true in Mr. Goodrich’s case, where his 
risk to reoffend is the product of dynamic, changeable factors.  (See PSI, pp.158, 163.)  
Therefore, in this case, a sentence which sufficiently considers all the goals of 
sentencing would take the opportunity to change those dynamic factors through a timely 
rehabilitative program.  (See PSI, p.178 (the psychosexual evaluation recommending 
precisely that); cf. Tr., p.21, Ls, 7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging that 
recommendation).)  Thus, the district court’s decision to focus on the goal of 
8 
punishment to the detriment of the goals of protection of society and rehabilitation 
constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Goodrich respectfully requests that this Court vacate the sentencing order 
and remand his case with instructions to retain jurisdiction. 
 DATED this 20th day of October, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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